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Since the beginning of the 1990s, the Italian Government has attempted to implement a new 
generation of policies aimed at reducing regional disparities. It is claimed that compared to the past, 
these policies should be more far reaching by emphasising the importance of the socio-institutional 
context in promoting regional convergence. In this paper, we use a novel dataset of regional social 
and economic indicators in order to produce a ranking of the performance of Italian regions with 
respect to both GDP per capita and competitiveness and look at the evidence surrounding the 
outcome of these policies. A frontier approach seems to be suitable for the purpose of this research, 
as it yields a ranking of performance scores where regions can be compared in cross-sectional and a 
temporal dimension. Early results seem to provide interesting evidence with respect to the regional 
features of the development policies. 
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90128, Palermo. Email: dpiacentino@economia.unipa.it. 1. Introduction 
During the 1990s regional policies in Italy have undergone a fundamental transformation. Recognition of 
the failure of the so-called “Extraordinary Intervention Measures” (Intervento Straordinario per il 
Mezzogiorno) to produce a persistent reduction of the North-South income gap promoted the adoption of 
new policies, which placed greater emphasis on the social and institutional context. While old policies 
evolved around a national authority in charge of both planning and funding, the new policies gave a more 
important role, especially at the planning stage, to sub-national units tied to the territory. The “New 
Intervention” (Nuova Programmazione) approach places the social environment, a collective public good, at 
the centre stage of the regional development process. With respect to this approach, however, some 
considerations seem to be important. Firstly, the literature linking growth and the socio-institutional context 
is still at an infant stage and a lot remain to be said about this particular relationship. In particular, traditional 
studies seem to address this problem with particular difficulty. Secondly, after almost ten years since the 
beginning of the New Planning strategy, it seems important to start a preliminary assessment of its effects. 
 
In this paper, we try to pursue two interests. The first is related the ability of a region to produce and 
compete in the international markets, with both its economic inputs, as indicated by the traditional toolbox of 
economic growth, and its social inputs, as stated in some recent contributions of economic geography. The 
second is to provide some grounding and some preliminary evidence on the new policy intervention strategy. 
Hence, we apply a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach to produce a ranking of the “efficiency” of 
each region over the period 1997-2003 and consider the role of both sets of inputs in determining a better 
“outcome”. We also propose an assessment of the validity of these results by means of a Monte Carlo 
experiment that produces bootstrap standard errors and an optimistic and a pessimistic ranking of the 20 
Italian regions over time. With these considerations in mind, in the next section we provide a brief overview 
of regional disparities and regional policies in Italy. Section 3 presents the data and section 4 discusses the 
methodology employed. Sections 5 and 6 comment on the obtained results and provide some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Regional disparities and regional policies in Italy. 
At the beginning of the 1950s, the “Extra-ordinary Intervention for the development of the Mezzogiorno 
Area” (Intervento Straordinario per lo Sviluppo del Mezzogiorno) was devised in order to reduce the 
substantial economic gap between Northern and Southern regions. This policy, which lasted until 1992, 
aimed at transforming the largely rural southern economy into an industrial economy. The main objective 
was to promote industrial development by sustaining the investment of both private and state owned 
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top-down strategy with little consideration for the local peculiarities of the territory where the policy would 
produce its effects. Planning was very much centralised with very little or no input from the local actors of 
development. Inspired largely by the neoclassical growth paradigm, the growth of firms’ capital investment 
and infrastructures (i.e. the growth of private and public stock of capital) should have caused the 
convergence of Northern and Southern regions. Clearly, other things equal (even same socio-institutional 
context) an increase of capital in the less developed regions should have produced the desired convergence 
(under the hypothesis of diminishing rates of returns). The irrelevance in this framework of the social and 
institutional context seems a too stringent assumption in the case of Italian regions. Indeed, the often poor 
quality of the social and institutional conditions in the South is likely to have been a cause of distorted use of 
public finances. Indeed, a now large empirical literature (see, among the others, Di Liberto, 1994; Mauro 
and Podrecca, 1994; Paci and Pigliaru, 1995; Paci and Saba, 1998; Margani and Ricciuti, 2001) has 
highlighted how the effects of old policies on the convergence process are at best confined to the short term. 
A common view attributes the causes of this failure to the inability of the policy to impact on the economic 
and social context which ultimately determines growth in the long run (Wolleb and Wolleb, 1993). The 
inability of southern region to project into the future the initial impulse of public expenditure is attributed 
mainly to the lack of this “absorptive capacity”. These criticisms were later incorporated in the spirit of the 
new policies, where a greater emphasis was placed on the social and institutional quality of the local 
economic systems (see table 1 for a comparison between the two intervention strategies). In the 2000-2006 
Community Support Framework (CSF) for Objective 1 regions, drafted for Italy by the Treasury 
(Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze): <<[…] A “break with the past” strategy is proposed in the form 
of the concerted action of the CSF and complementary policies at national level. These policies as a whole 
can lead to a permanent improvement in the economic, social and environmental context and generate a 
discontinuity in the behaviour and attitudes of economic operators […]>> (Ministero dell’Economia, 2004, 
pag.3). The new attitude of the CSF is partly founded on the recent attempts by economic growth theory and 
the economic geography literature to overcome some of the limitations of the neoclassical paradigm. While 
endogenous growth treats as endogenous factors such as human capital and technology, economic geography 
attributes a greater importance to the role of the social-institutional ground where growth takes place (see 
Martin and Sunley, 1998; and Rodriguez-Pose, 1998). However, the literature on the effects of these factors 
on growth is still at its infant stages, especially at the regional level. Hence, in this paper we make a first 
attempt to run an empirical analysis on the relationship between regional efficiency and a large number of 
factors pertaining to both the economic and the socio-institutional factors of growth. Since the consideration 
of social variables in regional economic systems makes the use of the traditional econometrics toolbox 
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Envelopment Analysis methodology. This approach allows us to produce a ranking of Italian regions, which 
depends also on social factors and to provide a preliminary comment on the new strategy of intervention. 
The next section and the following describe the data and the methodology employed.  
 
3. Data 
In order to evaluate the effects of the adoption of the new policies in the 2000-2006 CSF, the Italian 
National Statistical Office (ISTAT) has collected a dataset of “context key Indicators” and “break with the 
past variables”. In light of the above discussion, we have used this dataset to select two sets of inputs for 
each of the 20 Italian regions during the period 1997-2003. The first set refers to factors conventionally 
considered as growth determinants by endogenous growth models, the other tries to capture the focus 
variables of the CSF. In greater detail, the first set of inputs, named “economic context factors” includes the 
following indicators: 1) gross fixed capital formation over GDP; 2) number of employed in Research and 
Development every 1000 inhabitants; 3) number of employed belonging to the 25-64 age range taking part to 
education activities over the total number of employed in the same age range; 4) public
1 and private 
expenditure in Research and Development. While the first indicator refers to physical capital, the other three 
concern human capital and technology. The second set of inputs, broadly referred to as “social factors”, refer 
to the strategic lines of the CSF, and it includes the following indicators: 1) percentage of households’ 
complaints of irregular water distribution; 2) percentage of solid urban waste disposal recycled over the total 
disposal; 3) theatre and concert tickets sold every 100 inhabitants; 4) male-female employment gap in the 15-
64 age range; 5) percentage of population in the 14-18 age range enrolled in secondary schools; 6) new firms 
minus closed firms over total number of firms registered in the previous year multiplied by 100; 7) number 
of “petty” crimes reported every 1000 inhabitants; 8) number of organised crime related reports weighted by 
the average between the minimum and the maximum possible sentence; 9) percentage of crimes reported 
committed by minors; 10) percentage of households admitting to feel unsafe in their neighbourhood; 11) 
percentage of users who state satisfaction from the rail service; 12) percentage of households with internet 
access; 13) percentage of population over 14 participating to voluntary work and belonging to environmental 
and human rights associations; 14) North-South interest rate differential on short term loans. With respect to 
the indicators of output, we have considered both a conventional measure, such as per capita GDP and an 
indicator of competitiveness, such as exports over GDP.  
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1 This voice includes direct Government’s expenditure, Universities’ and companies owned by the Government 
expenditure. In order to assess the relationship between inputs and outputs at the regional level, we have employed 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methods in order to compute performance scores unaffected by the usual 
limitations of the traditional approaches based on parametric methods (see Rodriguez-Pose, 2000). 
 
4. A DEA of Regional Performance. 
In the traditional view, the concept of efficiency corresponds to the way, with reference to micro units, 
inputs and outputs are related through a relation of production, deterministic or stochastic, parametric or non-
parametric. The extension to a macroeconomic context where territorial areas are the considered units does 
not represent a formal difficulty, but clearly requires some caution on the setting of the analysis and the 
interpretation of the results. Following Simar and Wilson (2000a), we now briefly introduce the DEA 
methodology.
2 In the production analysis of a micro unit, such as a firm, production is constrained by 
technical possibilities, denoted for a given a technology by the production set 
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; consequently, the Farrell input-oriented technical efficiency 
for a generic point (x,y) is  { ) (y X } | inf x∈ = θ θ θ . Therefore, a production unit is technically efficient 
when it minimises the input levels for a given level of output. It is easy to transpose this analysis to the 
output-oriented case. Then, a unit will be technically efficient when it is able to maximise output for a given 
level of input. When considering a macro unit, such as a region, some words of caution are important. In this 
paper, the units under consideration are the 20 Italian regions for the years from 1997 to 2003 (hence, 
20x7=140 observations); the production process is virtual because we have considered as inputs determinants 
coming from the conventional growth literature and from the social/institutional environment and as output 
indicators of growth and export capacity of a regional area. Hence, no specific consideration can be made 
about the adopted technology (considered here as time-invariant) and about returns-to-scale (RTS), assumed 
here as in their most generic form, i.e. variable. The goal of this paper is to measure the “efficient” 
combination of “production function” factors and social factors that generates greater levels of development 
and competitive capacity for each region. In this respect, it is more appropriate to refer to the results as 
conditional measures of regional performance, and read the obtained values according to their ordered 
taxonomy. Anyway, the production possibilities set Ψ is unknown and only the combinations (x,y) of the 
effectively observed units are know. Therefore, it will be necessary to estimate in some way Ψ and X(y) and 
θ(x,y) for the input orientation, or with a similar reasoning, Y(x) and φ(x,y) for the output orientation. The 
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2 We refer the reader to the above citation for further details. main question is then to determine and exploit some of the statistical properties of these estimators for the 
interpretation of the results. Among all the possibilities, those obtained using DEA (Data Envelopment 
Analysis) are definitely the most common (Førsund e Sarafoglou, 2005). For an input-oriented DEA, we 
have: 
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It is interesting to note that Ψ  e  . It is immediate to translate this in 
output-oriented terms. 
Ψ ⊆ dea ˆ 1 ) , ( ˆ ) , ( 0 0 0 0 ≤ ≤ y x y x dea θ θ
In this analysis, the DEA estimation is applied under the generic (but plausible) assumption of variable 
returns to scale with a time invariant technology over the observed period. Therefore, the frontier is unique 
for the 20 regions over the 7 years under consideration (giving 140 observations). Moreover, we have chosen 
the output orientation, which implies the goal of achieving greater output, i.e. growth and development and 
international competitiveness, for given inputs, i.e. economic and social factors, under the realistic 
assumption that the regional unit, seen as the ensemble of entrepreneurial activities and private and public 
efforts, will be able to exercise a sufficient impact on the considered inputs and outputs (the inputs are not 
conceived as “environmental factors” but as de facto explanatory variables).  
In order to limit the well known dimensionality problem of DEA estimators, and given our interest on a 
broad-spectrum analysis, we normalise all the variables described in the previous section and do a mean 
collapse (with equal weight for each component) into one single output indicator and two input indicators 
(one economic and one social). We normalise the ‘z’ variable to 








when higher values of the variable indicate better conditions, and to 








when higher values denote worse conditions. Such a standardisation is invariant with respect to linear 
transformations of the starting variables and does not modify the linear association intensity between the 
variables. For presentation purposes, we then use a Shepard distance function (i.e. the inverse of the Farrell 
distance). We describe the main results in the next section. 
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   5. Results 
A preliminary look at the data 
A preliminary graphical analysis of the variables considered yields some first interesting comments. 
Figures 1 and 2 identify a positive relationship between the Output Index (O) and both type-I and type-II 
Inputs. Tuscany, in particular, seems to be the region with the highest level of output, despite a moderate 
level of type-I input. Calabria, on the other hand, presents the lowest levels of output. Two further groupings 
emerge from these figures. As expected, while Centre-North regions form a scatter cloud in the higher part of 
the graph, Southern regions are located in the lower part. Between these two groups, two regions, Abruzzo 
and Marche, are in an intermediate location. Figure 3 relates the ratio of Output to type-I Inputs and the ratio 
of Output to type-II Inputs. By dividing the diagram in four quadrants, we can identify the more efficient 
regions in the upper-right quadrant and the less efficient in the lower left quadrant. Again, Tuscany seems to 
be the most efficient region, while Calabria the less efficient one. In general, while the Southern regions are 
all in the lower-left quadrant, the others are mostly located in the central part of the scatter plot, allowing 
little further considerations. The application of DEA will allow us to obtain a regional ranking and analyse in 
greater detail the positioning of each region in terms of efficiency with respect to both sets of inputs. 
 
DEA results 
Using the DEA methodology described in section 4, we have obtained the performance scores for the 20 
Italian regions in every year under observation. The first two comlumns of table 2 report on the regional 
average performance scores in the considered period (together with the overall mean score). A first point 
worth noting is that over the time frame considered, the scores denote very little variability, with the 
exception of very few cases of limited interest. On the other hand, there is a greater variability of the scores 
at the cross-sectional level. These results give a portrait of the regional performance that is at large in line 
with the expected picture. Unsurprisingly, the regions with worse performance are confined to the South, 
while the more "efficient" regions are, on the other hand, distributed over the rest of the country. 
Interestingly, however, together with the Northern regions, three central regions - Tuscany (the best 
performer), Abruzzo and Marche - score among the top eight. It seems surprising how these last two regions, 
often included among the less developed, seem to score immediately after the more industrialised Northern 
regions, confirming a process of development started a decade ago. The others, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto 
and Emilia Romagna (belonging to the Nord-East) and Lombardy and Piedmont (in the Nord-West), are all 
located in the richer part of the country. The surprising performance of regions with a lower level of type-I 
inputs (related to the traditional production function analysis) but a higher level of type-II inputs (related to 
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the role of socio-institutional quality in the determination of higher efficiency scores.  
 
Robustness analysis 
Given that the DEA scores can be biased upwards, it seems important to have some information about the 
validity of the estimates. The lack of sufficient theoretical information regarding the DEA estimators, 
suggests the use of bootstrap procedures in order to simulate the Data Generating Process (DGP) of the 
observed data (see for further details Simar and Wilson, 1998, 2000b). Hence, we perform the bootstrap 
estimation by replicating the Monte Carlo experiment 2.000 times. Bootstrapping allows the computation of 
5% confidence intervals of the DEA scores, which can be interpreted as a “worse” and a “better” case 
scenario in the determination of the regional performances. A substantial reshuffling of the general ranking 
would undermine the validity of the results obtained using the standard DEA approach. Table 2 and Figure 4 
compare the traditional DEA estimates and the two scenarios obtained by the Bootstrapped DEA for the 20 
regions. A comparison of these results shows that no meaningful systematic difference can be detected in the 
positioning of the regions both cross-sectionally and over time. We interpret this as evidence in support of 
the validity of the approach and the results obtained. 
 
6. Final Remarks and Policy Discussion 
In this paper, we have proposed a DEA methodology in order to produce a ranking of Italian regions 
according to their “efficiency” with respect to the ability to achieve a certain level of performance, in terms 
of GDP per capita and export capacity, given a set of inputs referring to both economic and social factors. 
Our results indicate how in every year under observation Southern regions are located at the lower levels of 
the national scale. At the other side of the spectrum, Tuscany displays the best level of performance and 
Abruzzo and Marche, two Adriatic Sea coastal regions, confirm a tendency to climb up the national scale of 
efficiency. As expected, among the top six regions five are based in the Northern part of the country.  
A prominent feature of our results is that regions with better socio-institutional context perform better. In this 
respect, the evidence presented seems to validate the motivation behind the New Planning strategy in Italy, 
which attempts to target the socio-institutional context in order to promote greater output and greater 
competitiveness in Italian regions. Interestingly, however, our results show that over the period 1997-2003, 
the first seven years of life the new strategic policy intervention, no significant change in this ranking can be 
detected, especially with reference to the Southern regions. We can take this as preliminary evidence that the 
  8New Planning strategy has probably not already produced the desired results in terms of reduction of the 
Northern-Southern gap.  
The new regional policies give greater autonomy to the local authorities in the identification of the 
objectives and the formulation of the strategies for local development. Clearly, however, while a successful 
policy should be able to improve the local socio-institutional context, its success will also critically depend 
on the quality of the socio-institutional context where the policy intervention is devised and implemented. 
Consequently, sub-national units with lower ability will be by definition less able to identify and address the 
issues of an already troubled socio-economic context, hence exacerbating the problems and producing 
unwanted policy outcomes in terms of the reduction of regional disparities. Therefore, while a bottom-up 
approach can represent an opportunity for those regions that benefit from good governance, without an 
appropriate central rebalancing it can result in a further limitation for those regions which have a substantial 
deficit in terms of the quality of socio-economic governance. 
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  10APPENDIX I- Italian Regions 
 
Region           Abbreviation 
Abruzzo    abr 
Basilicata   bas 
Calabria    cal 
Campania     cam 
Emilia Romagna   emi 
Piemonte   pie 
Lombardia   lom 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  fvg 
Lazio    laz 
Toscana    tos 
Liguria    lig 
Marche    mar 
Molise    mol 
Puglia    pug 
Sardegna  sar 
Sicilia    sic 
Trentino     tre 
Umbria    umb 
Valle d’Aosta    val  
Veneto    ven 
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OUTPUT: 
1)  Gross Domestic Product (1995 prices) over population 
2)  Value of Exports as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
 
INPUT 1 (production function direct inputs): 
1)  Gross Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP 
2)  Employed participating to education activities  
3)  Employed in R&D every 1.000 inhabitants 
4)  Expenditure in R&D as a percentage of GDP 
 
INPUT 2 (socio-institutional context inputs): 
1)  Irregular water distribution 
2)  Differentiated solid waste disposal 
3)  Diffusion of theatre and music performances 
4)  Male-female employment gap 
5)  Secondary school enrollment 
6)  Net firm natality 
7)  Diffused (petty) crime index 
8)  Organised criminality index 
9)  Under age criminality index 
10) Households’ perception of criminality 
11) Satisfaction of rail transportation 
12) Internet diffusion 
13) Social services development capacity 
14) Financing capacity 
 






Policy  National Extraordinary Intervention  Ordinary Intervention, New Planning, 
European Policies for Objective1 Regions 
Planning/Funding Centralised 
Domestic funds distributed to the less 
developed regions in a centralised system. The 
authority in charge of financing is a temporary 
National Institution (“Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno”) 
Decentralised 
EU funds are distributed according to the 
directives contained in a document 
(Community Support Framework - CSF) 
approved by the member states and the 
European Commission. 
The CSF has priority axes and it is 
implemented through operational programmes. 
The realisation of the operational programmes 
involves the cooperation of the regions, which 
develop the Regional Operation Programmes 
(ROP)  
Areas of intervention  - Funding of Infrastructures 
- Investment in State Owned Enterprises 
(SOE) 
- Funding of Private Enterprises 
Axis I - Natural Resources: Optimisation of 
natural and environmental resources; Axis II - 
Cultural Resources: Optimisation of cultural 
and historical resources; Axis  III - Human 
Resources: Optimisation of human resources; 
Axis IV - Local Development Systems: 
Reinforcement and optimisation of local 
development systems; Axis V - Cities: 
Improvement of the quality of cities, local 
institutions and collective life; Axis VI - 
Networks and service nodes: Reinforcement of 
networks and service nodes. 
Goal  Improve infrastructures and promote top-
down industrialisation of disadvantaged areas. 
Improve the socio-institutional context and 
promote a bottom-up development of 
disadvantaged areas  
Results  - Impulse to the construction and services 
sectors 
- Creation of industrial poles characterised by 
weak linkages with little top and bottom 
integration (so called “cathedrals in the 
desert”) 
- Little self-sustaining development  
Expected Results: 
- Improvement of the social and institutional 
context. 
- Realisation of self-sustaining development 
Reasons for failure  - Lack of consideration for the socio-









 Table 2 – DEA Rankings of Regions 
 
  Standard DEA  Bootstrap DEA 
    Upper CI  Lower CI 
Rank   Region  Mean   Region  Mean   Region  Mean 
1 tos  0.96 tos  0.91  tos  0.68 
2 fri  0.67 ven  0.65  ven  0.57 
3 ven  0.65 fri  0.64  lom  0.55 
4 emi  0.65 emi  0.62  fri  0.53 
5 lom  0.61 lom  0.61  pie  0.50 
6 pie  0.58 pie  0.57  emi  0.46 
7 mar  0.50 mar  0.49  mar  0.45 
8 abr  0.42 abr  0.42  abr  0.38 
9  umb 0.32  umb  0.31  val  0.28 
10  val 0.31  val  0.30  umb 0.25 
11  lig 0.27  lig  0.26  tre  0.23 
12  tre 0.26  tre  0.26  laz  0.22 
13  bas 0.25  bas  0.25  bas  0.22 
14  laz 0.24  laz  0.24  lig  0.21 
15  mol 0.21  mol  0.21  mol  0.19 
16  pug 0.20  pug  0.20  pug  0.17 
17  cam 0.18  cam  0.18  cam  0.16 
18  sar 0.18  sar  0.17  sar  0.14 
19  sic 0.15  sic  0.14  sic  0.11 
20  cal 0.05  cal  0.05  cal  0.04 
Overall 
Mean    0.42    0.40    0.33 
Note: These rankings are obtained by collapsing regional scores into the period 
means (where odd scores are removed from the computation). Numbers in bold 
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